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INTRODUCTION
Let’s make a deal. You pay me $200,000 for a four-year experience with
no guarantee you will enjoy it or profit from it. During those four years, you
are bound by the rules I write—and I may change them unilaterally and
without notice. This deal must be accepted as is; there shall be no negotiating
terms. If you don’t make this deal, you will likely be consigned to minimum
wage work. Should you challenge in court any action I take, a judge will apply
existing case law that instructs him or her to defer to my specialized judgment
and my interpretation of the agreement. Do we have a deal?
As this Comment will demonstrate, those are roughly the terms that
govern students’ relationships with their universities, though it is doubtful
† J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2020; M.A.T., Fitchburg State
University, 2014; B.A., Skidmore College, 2007. The author wishes to thank Professor Tess
Wilkinson-Ryan for her early guidance and support and Nicholas Canelos, Rachel Taratuta-Titus,
and the Volume 168 editors for their helpful feedback.
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that American high school students understand this reality as they search for
the college of their dreams. One might argue this lack of understanding is of
no consequence: perhaps few students who ultimately attend college ever
seriously consider not attending college. After all, universities are seen as
playing an absolutely critical role in modern society: they “educate our young
people and create the skilled workforce that we need to compete with other
countries”; they “train future doctors, nurses, teachers, engineers, and
scientists”; they “build the technology and develop the business leaders that
will create a better tomorrow”; they “lead the way in searching for cures to
cancer” and other diseases; and they “play a key role in expanding
opportunity and reducing income inequality for those who have been left out
and left behind for too long.”1 Indeed, as of 2014, the earnings of a college
graduate were over sixty percent higher than those of a worker who attained
only a high school diploma.2 And perhaps most significantly, higher education
is thought to operate as a “multiplier, enhancing the enjoyment of all
individual rights and freedoms.”3 Can any institution which provides so many
benefits not just to its students but to society at large—can any institution so
revered—actually give students a raw deal?
While universities in general provide a net benefit for society, they—like
any institution—have at times abused their power. In the disciplinary context,
universities have suspended or expelled students for, among other things,
eating their meals in a forbidden place,4 smoking cigarettes,5 engaging in
premarital sex,6 improperly using legal knowledge acquired in law school,7
making unpatriotic statements,8 espousing atheistic views,9 joining forbidden
secret societies,10 exhibiting a lack of good manners,11 disclosing pedophiliac
urges,12 and protesting racial segregation.13 Outside the disciplinary context,
some universities have quadrupled tuition over a three-year period with no
1 The Rising Costs of Higher Education and Tax Policy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of
the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 114th Cong. 5 (2015) [hereinafter House Hearing] (statement of
Rep. John Lewis, Member, H. Comm. on Ways and Means).
2 Id.
3 JANE KOTZMANN, THE HUMAN RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH TO HIGHER EDUCATION:
WHY HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS SHOULD GUIDE HIGHER EDUCATION LAW AND POLICY 2
(2018) (internal quotations omitted).
4 Gott v. Berea Coll., 161 S.W. 204, 205 (Ky. Ct. App. 1913).
5 Tanton v. McKenney, 197 N.W. 510, 511 (Mich. 1924).
6 Hall v. Lee Coll., Inc., 932 F. Supp. 1027, 1028 (E.D. Tenn. 1996).
7 White v. Portia Law Sch., 174 N.E. 187, 188 (Mass. 1931).
8 People ex rel. Goldenkoff v. Albany Law Sch., 191 N.Y.S. 349, 350-51 (App. Div. 1921).
9 Robinson v. Univ. of Miami, 100 So. 2d 442, 443 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
10 People ex rel. Pratt v. Wheaton Coll., 40 Ill. 186, 186-87 (1866).
11 Steier v. N.Y. State Educ. Comm’r, 271 F.2d 13, 13-14 (2d Cir. 1959).
12 Gibson v. Walden Univ., LLC, 66 F. Supp. 3d 1322, 1324 (D. Or. 2014).
13 Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 153 (5th Cir. 1961).
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notice prior to enrollment,14 deceived students into taking out private loans
that were more expensive than advertised,15 charged increasingly large fees
on top of tuition in an apparent attempt to obscure the rising cost of college,16
grossly misrepresented job placement rates,17 and shut down unexpectedly and
left thousands of students with significant student loan debt and no degrees.18
Historically, little recourse has existed for students subjected to such
treatment. Students who attend public universities may bring a constitutional
challenge and try to state a claim that meets the high burden required to show
deficiency in process under the Due Process Clause.19 However, because
private universities are not always considered state actors bound by the same
restrictions of the United States Constitution, students at private universities
often must utilize other causes of action to challenge their treatment: most
commonly, their claims are framed as contractual disputes alleging breach of
contract or breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.20
The assertion of such contractual rights is seen as imposing on private

Basch v. George Washington Univ., 370 A.2d 1364, 1365-67 (D.C. 1977).
See Paul Fain, CFPB Penalizes Bridgepoint over Private Loans, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Sept. 13,
2016), https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2016/09/13/cfpb-penalizes-bridgepoint-over-pri
vate-loans [https://perma.cc/3DMC-XTVA] (noting that the owner of Ashford University was ordered
to pay an $8 million fine and make restitution of $23.5 million to over 1,200 defrauded students).
16 See Jon Marcus, Graduate Students are Mounting Degrees of Protest over ‘Hidden Fees,’ WASH.
POST (Aug. 2, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/graduate-studentsmounting-degrees-of-protest-over-hidden-fees/2019/08/02/a7f19f3c-b3c8-11e9-8949-5f36ff9
2706e_story.html [https://perma.cc/2BDT-HAUH] (reporting that the total amount of fees charged
by colleges has more than doubled between 2002 and 2017 and that one department at Baruch
College charges students an $8,000 “academic excellence fee” for reasons it was reluctant to divulge).
17 Michael Stratford, Corinthian Closes for Good, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Apr. 27, 2015),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/04/27/corinthian-ends-operations-remainingcampuses-affecting-16000-students [https://perma.cc/J4S7-8278].
18 Id.
19 See Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 217 (1985) (alleging “a property interest
in his continued enrollment” in medical school and arguing that “his dismissal was arbitrary and
capricious, violat[ed] his ‘substantive due process rights’ guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment,
and entitl[ed] him to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983”); see also Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v.
Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 79-80 (1978) (stating a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and “alleging,
among other constitutional violations, that petitioners had not accorded [the student] procedural
due process prior to her dismissal”).
20 See, e.g., Hubbard v. Howard Univ., No. 17-2262(RDM), 2018 WL 4539704, at *1 (D.D.C.
Sept. 21, 2018) (stating that plaintiff “Elyssa Hubbard brings this action for breach of contract and
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing against Defendant Howard University, alleging
that the university failed to provide adequate instruction . . .; denied ‘her right to initiate’ and to
pursue ‘a grade dispute pursuant to’ established grievance procedures; and deprived her of a
meaningful opportunity to challenge her academic suspension”); Alden v. Georgetown Univ., 734
A.2d 1103, 1107 (D.C. 1999) (noting that the student “also argues that Georgetown breached the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by failing to evaluate his academic performance in
good faith and on the merits, rather than based on factors unrelated to academic performance”).
14
15
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universities by way of the common law the same or similar requirements as
are imposed on public universities by the Due Process Clause.21
This Comment argues that the increasing complexity and heightened
significance of the student-university relationship demands a more effective
adjudicatory mechanism for student-university disputes than the old
contract-law model. In light of the rapid increase in the cost and importance
of a college education, Congress should condition the receipt of federally
guaranteed student loans, as well as other financing provided under the
Higher Education Act, upon the provision of satisfactory state administrative
oversight. If states are enlisted to help the federal government protect
students’ constitutional rights, universities may be less likely to engage in
arbitrary and highly detrimental action.
This Comment aims to examine how contracts came to be the dominant
cause of action for students to sue their universities and to propose a new
model of state oversight that would more appropriately strike a balance
between the rights and interests of students and their universities. Part I
examines the historical precedent that led to the development of the current
contract-law model; Part II explores the rapid evolution in the dynamics of
the student-university relationship and argues that the contract-law model no
longer serves as a reasonable check on university power; and Part III argues
that state administrative oversight would relieve courts of the burden of
dealing with lawsuits in which they cannot reasonably provide relief while
also better protecting the rights of students.
I. HISTORY OF THE STUDENT-UNIVERSITY RELATIONSHIP &
ASCENSION OF THE CONTRACT-LAW MODEL
The student-university relationship has evolved in tandem with the
system of higher education, both of which have come a long way from their
roots in early American history. Higher education in the American colonies
began as a mostly private enterprise, often sponsored by the church.22 In the
colonial era, universities were also chartered by the British Crown and by the
colonies; after the Revolution, the state and the federal government chartered
their own universities.23 By the middle of the nineteenth century, this
patchwork of colleges offering training in the classics began to appear
21 See Abbariao v. Hamline Univ. Sch. of Law, 258 N.W.2d 108, 113 (Minn. 1977) (declaring that
“[t]he requirements imposed by the common law [of contracts] on private universities parallel those
imposed by the due process clause on public universities”).
22 Sally M. Furay, Note, Legal Relationship Between the Student and the Private College or
University, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 244, 247 (1970).
23 See id. (citing as examples Columbia University, chartered by the Crown; Harvard
University, chartered by a colony; and George Washington University, chartered by Congress).

2019]

The Amorphous Student-University Contract

227

inadequate to meet the needs of an evolving nation. Amidst struggles to
assimilate unprecedented numbers of immigrants into a rapidly industrializing
economic landscape, calls for a revolution in higher education rang out.
The loudest of those voices to call out for modernization was Charles
Eliot, the President of Harvard University. In 1869, with the Civil War past
and the project of nation-building back at the center of American life, Eliot
published an article in The Atlantic calling for a “New Education” that was to
be more practical: A father today, he wrote, “will not believe that the same
methods which trained some boys well for the life of fifty or one hundred
years ago are applicable to his son” because “the kind of man which he wants his
son to make did not exist in all the world fifty years ago.”24 Many clamored for
a more vocationally-focused education, one designed to prepare students for the
realities of the emerging American economy.25 In response, Eliot proposed a
system of education based upon “the pure and applied sciences, the living
European languages, and mathematics” rather than upon the dead classical
languages that had previously been emphasized.26 This, he believed, would
ultimately make students “good engineers, manufacturers, architects, chemists,
merchants, teachers of science, or directors of mines and industrial works.”27
Even as Eliot worked to transform and modernize the curricula at
Harvard and its peer institutions, most colleges in the nineteenth century
continued to entertain relatively modest and transactional relationships with
their students. To enroll at the University of Michigan, for instance, one had
only to present a certificate of good character and pay tuition; to graduate
and receive a degree, one had only to attend “certain courses of lectures
through two terms of six months each.”28 Indeed, until the middle of the
nineteenth century, the major universities had no standardized written
examinations for admission, nor did they require prior knowledge of anything
other than Greek, Latin, and arithmetic in order to matriculate.29

24 Charles W.
Eliot, The New Education, THE ATLANTIC, (Feb. 1869),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1869/02/the-new-education/309049/ [https://perma
.cc/H4YZ-9SPM].
25 See generally Joseph F. Kett, “Theory Run Mad”: John Dewey and “Real” Vocational Education, 16 J.
GILDED AGE & PROGRESSIVE ERA 500, 501-05 (2017) (describing the intellectual development of the
vocational movement, and John Dewey’s attempt to meld vocational education with general education).
26 Eliot, supra note 24.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 See id. (noting that Yale’s Chemistry Department required no real exam for admission); see
also EDWIN CORNELIUS BROOME, A HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL DISCUSSION OF COLLEGE
ADMISSIONS REQUIREMENTS 30, 46, 126 (1903) (noting that “no mathematics beyond vulgar
arithmetic was required for admission to any college” and that not until the end of the nineteenth
century did Latin, Greek, and arithmetic cease to be the sole requirements for entrance).
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It was during this period of modernization that the student-university
relationship was shoehorned into the contract-law model. At its core, this was
a logical development, since “the elements of a traditional contract are present
in the implied contract between a college and a student . . . .”30 The student’s
submission of an application may be seen as an offer; the student’s admission
may be seen as acceptance by the university; and the payment of a deposit or
tuition may be seen as valuable consideration.31 Further, the relationship
between a student and a university was often expressly stated in a written,
albeit sparse, enrollment contract. Resembling a money-for-services
agreement, the mutual promises between a university and a student naturally
seemed to fit into a contract-law model.32
The relatively unsophisticated, transactional student-university
relationship of the nineteenth century thus provided the foundation for the
contract-law model. Unsurprisingly, then, most early suits between students
and their universities were filed by universities to recover unpaid tuition or
by students for a tuition refund or to compel conferral of a degree.33 Outside
of such disputes over tuition payments, which naturally brought to mind
notions of contract law, universities were considered virtually immune from
lawsuits; as a former General Counsel for the University of California system
once noted, the university up until the 1960s was “a citadel where
administrators governed students virtually unfettered by legal constraints.”34
By some accounts, the contract-law model was a reasonable fit in an era in
which the relationship between a student and university was often “expressly

30 Audrey Wolfson Latourette & Robert D. King, Judicial Intervention in the Student-University
Relationship: Due Process and Contract Theories, 65 U. DET. L. REV. 199, 236 (1988).
31 Id.
32 See Jonathan Flagg Buchter, Contract Law and the Student-University Relationship, 48 IND.
L.J. 253, 253 (1973) (stating that “[u]ntil the early 1900’s, the relationship between the student and
the institution was expressly stated in a written enrollment contract, which was essentially a business
agreement between the parent of the student and the institution”).
33 See Victoria J. Dodd, Non-Contractual Nature of the Student-University Contractual Relationship,
33 U. KAN. L. REV. 701, 702-03 (1985) (finding that “[m]ost of the earliest American school cases
utilizing a contract theory arose in limited situations in which a school was suing for unpaid tuition,
or a student, for a tuition refund”); see also Tr. of Howard Coll. v. Turner, 71 Ala. 429, 430 (1882)
(action for the recovery of damages from alleged breach of agreement to provide scholarship
assistance); Blumer Coll. of Natureopathy v. Nelson, 114 A. 115, 115 (Conn. 1921) (action by college
to compel tuition payment after student attended one class and left the college dissatisfied); Balt.
Univ. v. Colton, 57 A. 14, 15 (Md. 1904) (action for writ of mandamus to compel award of law degree
on student who had completed all coursework); Niedermeyer v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 61 Mo.
App. 654, 656-57 (Ct. App. 1895) (suit for recovery of $10 in excess tuition charged to and paid by a
law student).
34 SCOTT M. GELBER, COURTROOMS AND CLASSROOMS: A LEGAL HISTORY OF
COLLEGE ACCESS, 1860-1960, at 1-2 (2016).
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stated in a written enrollment contract.”35 In particular, contract law was seen
as providing to students at private universities some of the same due process
protections that would eventually be recognized for students at statesponsored universities.36
Indeed, the contract-law model was successful in the limited role it was
called on to play. Specifically, it has helped students to avoid arbitrary and
capricious university action in some egregious cases—including some cases in
the modern era. The case of Johnson v. Lincoln Christian College provides an
illustrative example. During Gregory Johnson’s last semester at Lincoln
Christian College in Lincoln, Illinois, another student informed school
administrators that Johnson “might be homosexual.”37 As a result, the College
required Johnson to attend private counseling sessions, which Johnson
believed would be confidential.38 However, the contents of these sessions
were ultimately disclosed to college administrators.39 The administrators
subsequently called Johnson’s mother to inform her that her son was being
dismissed on account of allegations of homosexuality.40 Furthermore, despite
the fact that Johnson had completed all of his coursework satisfactorily, they
threatened to stamp the reason for Johnson’s dismissal on his transcript and
then refused to issue him his diploma.41 The court held that on the basis of
those facts, Johnson had stated a claim for relief based on a breach of the
implied contract inherent in every student-university relationship.42
The case of Russell v. Salve Regina College also demonstrates the success of
the contract-law model in curbing the most egregious university actions.
Sharon Russell was well on her way to a nursing degree at Salve Regina
College in Newport, Rhode Island when she began to suffer numerous
indignities and slights as an obese person.43 There was the “agonizing search
for uniforms and scrub gowns that would fit a woman of Russell’s girth” as
35 Buchter, supra note 32, at 253. But see Latourette & King, supra note 30, at 231-32 (arguing
that over time “the contract theory in student-university disputes has not afforded students
significant protection of individual rights” because suits relying on the contract theory “almost
uniformly resulted in affirmation of the university action”).
36 See Latourette & King, supra note 30, at 230-31 (stating that students at private universities
“rely on . . . contract law to challenge university actions perceived as abusive of institutional
discretion” by utilizing the “vehicle of contract law” to “achieve many of the same due process
concepts and protections afforded their state counterparts”).
37 Johnson v. Lincoln Christian Coll., 501 N.E.2d 1380, 1382 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
38 Id.
39 Id. at 1383.
40 Id. at 1382.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 1384 (concluding that “Johnson’s complaint states a valid cause of action for breach of
an implied contract between Johnson and LCC, and the trial court erred in dismissing count I of
the complaint”).
43 Russell v. Salve Regina Coll., 649 F. Supp. 391, 395 (D.R.I. 1986).
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well as “a tendency on the part of faculty members to employ Russell . . . to
model hospital procedures incident to the care of obese patients” and
“prolonged lectures and discussions about the desirability of weight loss.”44
Ultimately, she was dismissed from Salve Regina College’s nursing program
because, in her words, she didn’t conform to the “Salve image.”45 Even more
humiliating, the Court seemed to delight in mocking the situation. “The
problems presented by this lawsuit are weighty in every sense of the word,”
wrote the Court.46 More cringeworthy puns followed: “[C]ontagion was not
legitimately at issue—after all, there is no allegation of communicable
corpulence here” and “evidence . . . tends to show that Russell’s girth did not
reduce her proficiency.”47 Ultimately, though, the Court sided with Russell,
allowing her claim to move past the summary judgment stage: “Faced with
contrary opinions from qualified health care professionals and particularized
allegations of personal animosity born of obesophobic obsession, this issue,
viewed in the manner most hospitable to the plaintiff ’s case, survives
[summary judgment].”48
Successful lawsuits like Russell’s and Johnson’s, which seemed to suggest
courts were willing to act as a check on arbitrary university action, are proof
that students may at times prevail under the contract-law model.49 However,
despite the fact that students seldom obtain relief from suits sounding in
contract, the language of contracts nevertheless has aided litigants by allowing
them to frame issues in a manner that gradually became “familiar to the
court”; in doing so, litigants can “cloak[]” their actions “in the mantle of
precedent.”50 Further, some scholars argued that the judiciary was and
remains uniquely well suited to use the language of contracts—particularly
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing—to appropriately balance
rights and develop constitutional standards; in turn, it was suggested, the
university would benefit from the “gentle guidance of the courts to evolve
clearer standards of procedures and more codified concepts of academic
custom and usage.”51 Unfortunately, history shows that no such standards ever
Id.
Id. at 406 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 407.
Id. at 405-06.
Id. at 406-07.
Indeed, it has always been technically possible for students to prevail in contract disputes
with their universities. See, e.g., Balt. Univ. v. Colton, 57 A. 14, 17 (Md. 1904) (holding that a law
student could seek a writ of mandamus compelling his university to confer a degree on him after he
was arbitrarily denied one). The issue is rather whether the scales of justice are properly balanced
such that a meritorious case can typically succeed.
50 Robert Faulkner, Judicial Deference to University Decisions Not to Grant Degrees, Certificates, and
Credit—the Fiduciary Alternative, 40 SYRACUSE L. REV. 837, 851 (1989).
51 Virginia Davis Nordin, The Contract to Educate: Toward a More Workable Theory of the StudentUniversity Relationship, 8 J.C. & U.L. 141, 148 (1981).
44
45
46
47
48
49
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evolved out of judges’ application of the contract-law model, and it remains
very difficult for students to prevail against their universities.
II. CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES & CALL FOR REFORM
While a handful of cases like Russell and Johnson seem to suggest that the
contract-law model is an appropriate scale on which to balance the rights of
students and their universities, seismic social and economic changes in the
second half of twentieth century vastly altered the landscape of American
higher education, triggering an explosion of new lawsuits and leaving
successful plaintiffs like Sharon Russell and Gregory Johnson the exception
rather than the norm.
To understand how this occurred, it is necessary to trace the rapid
evolution of the educational landscape over the last century. At the conclusion
of World War II, with Europe in ruins, the United States stood atop the world
in economic and military power. The United States at that time produced two
times more petroleum than the rest of the world combined, had a near global
monopoly on the burgeoning aerospace and electronics industries, and
retained two-thirds of the world’s gold and half of all its monetary reserves.52
Over the next twenty-five years, the American economy generated over
twenty million new jobs and the size of the middle class doubled—an
“unprecedented achievement[] for any modern society.”53
This economic miracle led to what one historian has called the “most
significant development in the history of American education.”54 Specifically,
the extraordinary postwar economic expansion, along with the GI Bill,
propelled the development of the modern university and boosted enrollment:
more than twice the number of Americans received college degrees in 1950
than had received degrees just ten years earlier.55 Colleges ceased to be
“villages with priests” and became “impersonal and bureaucratic ‘multiversities.’”56 By 1948, ten universities had enrolled at least 20,000 students.57
Then, between 1961 and 1991, as the Baby Boomers came of age, the number
of college students increased from “‘just over’ 4.1 million . . . to almost 14.2
52 DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN DEPRESSION
AND WAR, 1929–1945, at 856-57 (1999).
53 Id. at 857.
54 JAMES T. PATTERSON, G RAND E XPECTATIONS: T HE U NITED STATES, 1945–1974, at

68-69 (1996).
55 See id. (noting that in 1940, only 216,500 Americans received college degrees, but that in
1950, approximately 497,000 of them did).
56 Id. at 69; see also House Hearing, supra note 1, at 32 (statement of Mary Frances McCourt)
(noting that the Indiana University system enrolls over 100,000 students and has an annual operating
budget that exceeds $3.3 billion).
57 PATTERSON, supra note 54, at 69.
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million,” while the number of colleges and universities in the United States
between 1960 and 1990 increased by more than 50% in response to the
increased demand for higher education.58 However, a 50% increase in the
number of colleges by 1990 was unable to keep pace with the 346% increase
in the number of college students by 1991.
Such profound changes in the demand for higher education transformed
the educational marketplace, resulting in skyrocketing tuition fees, the rapid
growth of endowments and operating budgets, and the marketing of college
as an experience rather than just an educational opportunity. First, tuition
rose drastically in the second half of the twentieth century and into the
twenty-first century, climbing by some estimates 1,200% over the last forty
years.59 Today, sticker prices for many private colleges regularly exceed
$50,000 a year, and are approaching $70,000 in some cases.60 For many
American families, one of “the biggest financial challenges in modern
life . . . is[] figuring out how to pay for the cost of college.”61 To compete for
students willing to pay such fees, colleges over the last thirty years
dramatically increased the size of their administrative staff and “engaged in
an ‘arms race’ with each other to build things like movie theaters and luxury
gyms.”62 While steep increases in college tuition might suggest that
universities are struggling to cover their increased expenditures, this appears
58 Hazel Glenn Beh, Student versus University: The University’s Implied Obligations of Good Faith
and Fair Dealing, 59 MD. L. REV. 183, 187 (2000).
59 See House Hearing, supra note 1, at 3 (statement of Chairman Peter Roskam) (stating that the
1,200% increase in tuition over the last forty years eclipses even the breathtaking pace of inflation in
healthcare costs). But see Nick Anderson, Attention, College Shoppers. These Schools are Slashing their
Prices, WASH. POST (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/attentioncollege-shoppers-these-schools-are-slashing-their-prices/2019/01/21/e384eca0-12bc-11e9-90a8136fa44b80ba_story.html?utm_term=.a0f48dad6a76 [https://perma.cc/QCS9-L8A5] (suggesting
that tuition increases may have plateaued, as some colleges are now reducing tuition to attract
students in a more competitive marketplace).
60 See Average Published Undergraduate Charges by Sector and by Carnegie Classification, 2018-19,
COLLEGE BD., https://trends.collegeboard.org/college-pricing/figures-tables/average-publishedundergraduate-charges-sector-2018-19 [https://perma.cc/7GUW-NB35] (showing that the average
yearly cost of a four-year private college is $48,510); Farran Powell & Emma Kerr, See the Average
College Tuition in 2019-2020, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept. 9, 2019),
https://www.usnews.com/education/best-colleges/paying-for-college/articles/paying-for-collegeinfographic [https://perma.cc/L8BB-LE28] (reporting that more than 100 private colleges in the
United States charge more than $50,000 a year); Ron Lieber, Why It’s So Hard to Calculate What You’ll
Pay for College, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/19/yourmoney/paying-for-college.html [https://perma.cc/BC4H-PBNQ] (noting that among elite private
schools in New England, such as Smith, Wellesley, and Mount Holyoke, the list price of a year of
tuition approaches $70,000).
61 House Hearing, supra note 1, at 3 (statement of Chairman Peter Roskam).
62 Id. at 4; see also Beh, supra note 58, at 187 (claiming that “[t]he proliferation of colleges means
that . . . colleges must actively market themselves to stand apart and can no longer simply wait for
student applications.”).
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not to be the case: as of 2013, more than 90 colleges and universities had
endowments valued above one billion dollars and more than 40 college
presidents were being paid more than a million dollars a year—largely to
conduct fundraising to grow their endowments even further.63
Accompanying these rapid shifts in the economic landscape of American
higher education was an uptick in the gatekeeping role of universities. In the
decades following World War II, the United States economy shifted its focus
from manufacturing to services, from blue collar work to white collar work.
At the same time, people increasingly turned to colleges and universities to
provide the training necessary to gain access to the new jobs in the American
economy.64 Today, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, workers with
bachelor’s degrees make almost twice what workers with only a high school
diploma make; and workers with professional degrees make almost three
times what their counterparts with only a high school diploma make.65
Education, as one journalist has noted, “is the best way to cross class barriers,”
but given the high cost of college, “in many cases, education seems to be the
barrier.”66 As the Fifth Circuit pointed out, “[i]t requires no argument to
demonstrate that education is vital” to ensure that citizens would be able “to
earn an adequate livelihood, to enjoy life to the fullest, [and] to fulfill as
completely as possible the duties and responsibilities of good citizens.”67
In light of the increasing cost and significance of a college education, it is
not surprising that lawsuits seeking to vindicate student rights proliferated
in the latter half of the twentieth century. The increase in litigation was aided
by the landmark decision of the Fifth Circuit in Dixon v. Alabama State Board
of Education, which was brought following the dismissal of African-American
students for disciplinary reasons—subsequently revealed to be a request for
service at a whites-only lunch counter on campus.68 The Circuit, noting that it
63 House Hearing, supra note 1, at 4 (statement of Chairman Peter Roskam). See also Greeley
Myers, University Presidents and the Role of Fundraising at Private Liberal Arts Universities at 1
(May 2016) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Walden University) (on file with author) (finding that
“many university presidents view fundraising as a primary responsibility in their jobs” and “many
struggle to balance fundraising with other challenging demands”).
64 Faulkner, supra note 50, at 845 (noting that like banks and insurance companies, “colleges
offer a service without which the student could not accomplish certain important goals” and from
which the modern student expects “a substantial return, usually in the form of knowledge, prestige,
and employment”).
65 See Elka Torpey, Measuring the Value of Education, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. (Apr. 2018),
https://www.bls.gov/careeroutlook/2018/data-on-display/education-pays.htm
[https://perma.cc/
G5MF-ZQDY] (demonstrating that in a work week a person can expect to earn $712 with a high
school diploma, $1,173 with a bachelor’s degree, and $1,836 with a professional degree).
66 This American Life: Three Miles, CHICAGO PUBLIC RADIO (Mar. 13, 2015), available online
at https://www.thisamericanlife.org/550/transcript [https://perma.cc/ZP7E-3HW5] (emphasis added).
67 Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Ed., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 1961).
68 Id. at 152-53, n.3 (5th Cir. 1961).
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was unconscionable to deny to students “the protection[s] given to a pickpocket,”
held that state universities are an arm of the state and that public school students
therefore must be afforded the protections of procedural due process.69
The surge in legal disputes following Dixon can be seen as a natural
outgrowth of the rights consciousness of the era. During the 1960s, the
African-American Civil Rights Movement, the Women’s Movement, the Gay
Rights Movement, and the Anti-War Movement catalyzed a revolution in
individual rights pushed both from the bottom-up by student groups and
from the top-down by lawmakers. These battles, fought largely in the courts
and in the legislatures, were replicated by students seeking greater
accountability and more protection.70 Indeed, according to one survey, over
90% of college suits reported prior to the year 2010 were brought after 1969,
in the wake of Dixon and at the height of the era of rights-consciousness.71
This change goes to show that students who invest significant sums of money
may reasonably expect accountability. Consequently, they have asked courts
to hold their universities responsible for providing inaccurate information
about degree requirements,72 for cancelling courses,73 for cancelling programs
of study,74 for arbitrary admissions policies,75 for unpredictably large increases
in tuition,76 and for bait-and-switch tactics in which universities reneged on
promises not to raise fees for the duration of study.77
As lawsuits brought by students against their universities proliferated in
the midst of the revolution in rights-consciousness and in the wake of Dixon,

69 Id. at 158 (noting that it is shocking that “officials of a state educational institution” do not
“understand the elementary principles of fair play” and holding that “fundamental constitutional
principle[s] support [its] holding that due process requires notice and some opportunity for hearing
before a student at a tax-supported college is expelled for misconduct”).
70 See PATTERSON, supra note 54, at 568 (arguing that a “major trend[] of the era” was “the
rise of rights-consciousness,” which was imbued with “special urgency” by the civil rights movement,
and which culminated in a “near-irresistible” drive for the expansion of individual rights); see also
Elizabeth L. Grossi & Terry D. Edwards, Student Misconduct: Historical Trends in Legislative and
Judicial Decision-Making in American Universities, 23 J.C. & U.L. 829, 834 (1997) (noting that
“[i]ndividual rights were fast becoming a major issue for society-at-large, and students on U.S.
college and university campuses sought expansion of their rights through actions on campus and in
courts of law”).
71 GELBER, supra note 34, at 2.
72 Olsson v. Bd. of Higher Educ., 402 N.E.2d 1150, 1152 (N.Y. 1980).
73 Zumbrun v. Univ. of S. Cal., 101 Cal. Rptr. 499, 502 (Ct. App. 1972).
74 Eden v. State, 103 Misc. 2d 461, 462-63 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1980).
75 Steinberg v. Chicago Med. Sch., 371 N.E.2d 634, 638-39 (Ill. 1977).
76 Basch v. George Washington Univ., 370 A.2d 1364, 1365-66 (D.C. 1977); see also Kevin Stone,
Brnovich Wants Arizona Supreme Court to Hear Tuition Case Appeal, KTAR NEWS (Jan. 29, 2019, 4:34
PM), http://ktar.com/story/2417554/brnovich-wants-arizona-supreme-court-to-hear-tuition-caseappeal/ [https://perma.cc/44AU-JL42] (describing a suit brought by Arizona’s Attorney General alleging
the 300% increase in state university tuition over a 15-year period violated Arizona’s constitution).
77 Kashmiri v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 635, 638-39 (Ct. App. 2007).
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scholars, courts, and students began to confront contract law’s inability to
provide meaningful relief in the context of the student-university relationship.
First, while contract principles were “developed to adjudicate disputes
between commercial interests,” by the late 1960s this characterization no
longer accurately described the student-university relationship.78 Indeed, it is not
clear that students today understand they are even creating a contract by enrolling
in college, which makes it difficult to bargain for terms or to understand fully the
reasonable expectations that each party should have of the other.79
Second, student-university contracts are contracts of adhesion, which at
their worst can be deceptive and oppressive.80 More problematic, many courts
are unwilling to treat the student-university contract as unconscionable
contracts of adhesion,81 which would require them to, among other things,
scrutinize the contract with more rigor and construe ambiguous terms against
the party that drafted the terms.82
Buchter, supra note 32, at 262.
See id. at 263 (noting that courts have upheld waiver clauses and other catalogue provisions
despite “no finding that [such clauses or provisions] had been read or understood as binding by a
reasonable student”); see also Dodd, supra note 33, at 714 (stating that many universities, failing to
understand that their brochures and bulletins will constitute contractual language in the event that
litigation ensues, enlist university administrators rather than lawyers to draft their materials). This
problem is exacerbated by the fact that the universities can change their bulletins and brochures
yearly and without notice. See id. at 714-15, 728 (noting that this creates even more uncertainty in
the student-university relationship).
80 See, e.g., Schnuerle v. Insight Commc’ns Co., 376 S.W.3d 561, 575-76 (Ky. 2012) (stating that
adhesion contracts are not “per se improper” because they can “significantly reduc[e] transaction
costs in many situations,” but noting that they can also be “one-sided, oppressive and unfairly
surprising contracts”); see also Ilan v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 632 F. Supp. 886, 891 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (noting that courts will not enforce contracts of adhesion that are “unduly oppressive,
unconscionable, or against public policy”).
81 See, e.g., Wagner v. Holtzapple, 101 F. Supp. 3d 462, 477 n.4 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (rejecting
“counsel’s argument that the [university] handbook amounts to a contract of adhesion” since
“[a]ttending a university and agreeing to a reasonable code of conduct as outlined by its handbook
is not what the doctrine of adhesion contracts had contemplated”); Eisele v. Ayers, 381 N.E.2d 21,
24-25, 27 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (rejecting plaintiffs’ claim that their contracts with Northwestern
University were contracts of adhesion, even though the university unilaterally imposed a 57.6% yearto-year tuition increase—an increase seven times larger than the past average tuition increases—and
left the students with no ability to negotiate or contest the increase); Newland v. AEC S. Ohio Coll.
L.L.C., 47 N.E.3d 231, 232 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016) (overruling trial court’s determination that a
student-university contract containing an arbitration clause was unconscionable).
82 See Thompson v. Lithia ND Acquisition Corp. #1, 896 N.W.2d 230, 236 (N.D. 2017) (stating
that courts must examine a contract of adhesion “with special scrutiny to assure that it is not applied
in an unfair or unconscionable manner against the party who did not participate in its drafting”)
(quoting Strand v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 693 N.W.2d 918, 924 (N.D. 2005)); Brown v. Genesis
Healthcare Corp., 729 S.E.2d 217, 228 (W. Va. 2012) (noting that “[a] contract of adhesion should
receive greater scrutiny than a contract with bargained-for terms to determine if it imposes terms
that are oppressive, unconscionable or beyond the reasonable expectations of an ordinary person.”);
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (stating that “[i]n
choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement or a term thereof, that meaning
78
79
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Third, contracts exist to provide security to private parties that neither
will commit a material breach of an agreement, but in practice courts construe
the student-university contract to forbid only egregious or outrageous breach
as opposed to material breach.83 For example, when Sung Park was dismissed
from the Indiana University School of Dentistry, Park brought suit alleging
that the school violated the student-university contract by failing to follow
the dismissal procedures outlined in the school’s own handbooks.84 The
Seventh Circuit concluded that even if the school did fail to follow its own
procedures, that would not automatically lead to a finding of breach since
“Indiana courts have taken a flexible approach to the scope of contractual
promises between students and universities” in which “hornbook rules cannot
be applied mechanically where the principal is an educational institution.”85
Finally, such contracts are frequently governed by the doctrine of
academic deference, under which the judiciary exhibits a reluctance to
interfere in the affairs of private institutions of higher education.86 As one
court explained, academic deference is desirable because judicial interference
would cause colleges to become too standardized and would undermine the
“special aura” that “distinguishes” one college from the next—which often is
the very reason a certain college is “selected by parents and students.”87 One
doubts, however, that the “special aura” of a university includes any of the
following decisions in which courts have refused to scrutinize university
decision-making: when degree requirements are changed after satisfactory
completion of a program of study;88 when a comprehensive exam is
administered improperly;89 when the school’s catalog is silent or ambiguous

is generally preferred which operates against the party who supplies the words or from whom a
writing otherwise proceeds”).
83 See 23 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 63:3 (4th ed. 2007) (stating that courts define “‘breach of contract’ as a ‘material
failure of performance’ of a duty arising under or imposed by an agreement”); see also Dodd, supra
note 33, at 708 (arguing that education cases “set a very high standard for a breach of contract, higher
than in other contexts”).
84 Sung Park v. Ind. Univ. Sch. of Dentistry, 692 F.3d 828, 831 (7th Cir. 2012).
85 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
86 See, e.g., Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 90 (1978) (stating
that “[l]ike the decision of an individual professor as to the proper grade for a student in his course,
the determination whether to dismiss a student for academic reasons requires an expert evaluation
of cumulative information and is not readily adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or
administrative decisionmaking” and declining “to further enlarge the judicial presence in the
academic community”).
87 Boehm v. Univ. of Pa. Sch. of Veterinary Med., 573 A.2d 575, 581-82 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990)
(quoting Schulman v. Franklin and Marshall Coll., 538 A.2d 49, 52 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988)).
88 Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 401 F. Supp. 381, 382-83 (N.D. Ga. 1975), rev’d, 529 F.2d 448
(5th Cir. 1976).
89 Tanner v. Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ill., 459 N.E.2d 324, 325-27 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
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about degree requirements;90 or when a student is expelled for having mental
health problems91 or for being gay.92 As a result, students who may have
invested tens of thousands of dollars may be left unable to graduate or secure
employment in the field of their choice. Academic deference thus compounds
the difficulty of securing relief following a material breach of a university’s
non-administrative decisions; indeed, it makes it nearly impossible for
students to prevail against their universities in court.93 While courts remain
free to suggest more procedural protections for students—such as, in the
context of disciplinary proceedings, the use of an impartial decisionmaker,
the provision of notice of allegations, or the requirement of an opportunity
to be heard—they seldom impose such protections.94
Aside from overarching doctrinal limitations, there are also practical
limitations to using the law of contracts as a cause of action. First, unlike in
the early twentieth century, in today’s student-university suits there is seldom
a single written instrument that contains all the terms of a contract.95 As a
result, courts are placed in the unfortunate position of assuming the terms of
a contract rather than requiring the parties to prove the terms of the
contract.96 More problematically, courts accept that any of the publications of
a university or college may contain the express—though not the exclusive—
terms of a contract between the student and the university.97 It is doubtful, as
Blank v. Bd. of Higher Educ., 273 N.Y.S.2d 796, 801-03 (Spec. Term 1966).
See Aronson v. N. Park Coll., 418 N.E.2d 776, 777-78, 782 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (reversing a
jury award of $22,321.60 for a student dismissed at the end of her first semester of college after she
was deemed to be a chronic paranoid).
92 Lexington Theological Seminary, Inc. v. Vance, 596 S.W.2d 11, 11-12 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979)
(regarding a student who was dismissed after conclusion of all studies required for graduation
because his admission of homosexuality was found to have violated the student handbook’s desirable
personality traits clause).
93 Nordin, supra note 51, at 168 (arguing that “[t]he judicial attitude which states its diffidence
in deciding academic matters is in strong contrast to the judicial attitude which weighs complex fact
situations in medical malpractice, anti-trust, patent or tax cases”).
94 See, e.g., A. v. C. Coll., 863 F. Supp. 156, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (identifying procedures that
would help to minimize the need for judicial intervention in disciplinary matters without requiring
their adoption).
95 See, e.g., Guckenberger v. Bos. Univ., 974 F. Supp. 106, 150 (D. Mass. 1997) (“Under
Massachusetts law, the promise, offer, or commitment that forms the basis of a valid contract can be
derived from statements in handbooks, policy manuals, brochures, catalogs, advertisements, and
other promotional materials”); see also Scott R. Sinson, Judicial Intervention of Private University
Expulsions: Traditional Remedies and a Solution Sounding in Tort, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 195, 208-09 (1997)
(stating that the terms of the student-university contract can be derived from “catalogues and
manuals, bulletins, registration forms and other institutional documents”).
96 See, e.g., Tedeschi v. Wagner Coll., 404 N.E.2d 1302, 1305 (N.Y. 1980) (stating that “[c]ontract
theory is not wholly satisfactory, however, because the essentially fictional nature of the contract
results in its generally being assumed rather than proved . . . .”).
97 See, e.g., Jansen v. Emory Univ., 440 F. Supp. 1060, 1062 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (accepting that the
bulletins and catalogue of the university contained the terms of the student-university contract).
90
91
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some judges have noted, that students understand that publications or
marketing materials like college catalogs and bulletins are binding and can be
used to construe the terms of a contract.98 Even if students did understand
the binding power of these documents, it is even more doubtful that they
would have any power to bargain their way out of what are essentially
contracts of adhesion. Finally, because contracts are matters of state law,
students that apply to universities in multiple states are unlikely to comprehend
how their rights or their obligations might differ from state-to-state.99
III. AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL IN ADMINISTRATIVE OVERSIGHT
Under a contract-law model that allows students to file a claim but seldom
permits them to obtain relief, universities have little incentive to reform
themselves. If change is to occur, it must occur due to outside pressures.100
Though the pressures of the market might eventually lead to change,
government oversight provides a more intentional path forward. Further,
oversight would not be a new phenomenon in higher education; in fact, since
at least the 1960s, the federal government has recognized the need for
congressional oversight of higher education.101 Historically, both Republican
and Democratic administrations and Congresses have enacted regulations to
protect taxpayer investments in higher education and to prevent the arbitrary
or even “predatory” behavior of universities receiving federal funds or federal
support.102 In a recent Senate hearing, members of both major political parties
recognized the need for reform. Senator Patty Murray, a Democrat
representing Washington, argued for more oversight to require that colleges
disclose, among other data points, employment outcomes and average student
debt.103 On the other side of the aisle, Senator Lamar Alexander, a Republican
98 See, e.g., Ryan v. Hofstra Univ., 324 N.Y.S.2d 964, 973-74 (Spec. Term 1971) (noting the
difficulty of proving that students or their parents understood catalogs and other university
publications as contractual terms).
99 See, e.g., Hux v. S. Methodist Univ., 819 F.3d 776, 781-82 (5th Cir. 2016) (noting that some
states, such as Texas, don’t recognize a “contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing” in the
student-university relationship, which leaves students at some private universities without the full
range of protections typically afforded by the due process clause and contract law).
100 See House Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Chairman Peter Roskam) (submitting “that
higher education is not likely to reform itself ” without external pressures).
101 See Beh, supra note 58, at 194 (arguing that the Student Right To Know Provisions of the
Higher Education Act demonstrate “congressional recognition that higher education is both a
product and a relationship that begs for external review”).
102 Spiros Protopsaltis & Libby Masiuk, Protecting Students and Taxpayers: Why the Trump
Administration Should Heed History of Bipartisan Efforts, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES,
at 1 (Dec. 1, 2017).
103 Recalibrating Regulation of Colleges and Universities: A Report from the Task Force on Government
Regulation of Higher Education: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions,
114th Cong. 5 (2015) [hereinafter Senate Hearing] (statement of Sen. Patty Murray) (contending that
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representing Tennessee and a former United States Secretary of Education,
agreed that taxpayers deserved better regulations and argued that “neither
colleges nor students” were “well served by the jungle” of regulations that
then existed.104 While there is a history of bipartisanship in this area, it is also
clear that the current state of oversight is bleak and only getting bleaker as
the Trump Administration seeks to dismantle what is left of the federal
regulatory functions of the United States Department of Education that aim
to hold universities accountable.105
While education has historically been a matter of state policy, the federal
government has been increasingly involved in education, and particularly in
higher education. The Higher Education Act of 1965, which governs the
federal regulatory scheme for universities, is almost 1,000 pages long, and
there are more than 1,000 more pages in the Code of Federal Regulations that
work in tandem with the Act.106 Today, federal aid programs provide credit
for about 90% of all student loans in the United States and the federal
government invests $241.3 billion annually into financial aid for higher
education.107 The disbursement of such immense financial support by the
federal government arguably provides both the legal and moral justification
for additional oversight. Thankfully, Congress need not start from scratch in
crafting a more effective regulatory scheme, as some models for effective
oversight already exist.
The most promising of all prior oversight mechanisms were the State
Postsecondary Review Entities (SPREs) established as part of the 1992
reauthorization of the Higher Education Act. Under the reauthorization, each
state was required to create an SPRE to improve consumer protection with
stronger oversight and investigatory functions.108 The animating feature of
the SPREs was to be the strengthening of the so-called “triad” of higher

“[w]hen students are deciding where to attend, they should have the tools to find out if their college
or university will give them a good return on their investment and hard work.”).
104 Id. (statement of Sen. Lamar Alexander, Chairman, S. Comm. On Health, Education,
Labor, and Pensions).
105 See Protopsaltis & Masiuk, supra note 102, at 2 (critiquing the Trump Administration’s 2017
plan to undermine two Obama Administration rules that allowed the Secretary of Education to
“discharge the loans of borrowers who were . . . mistreated by their schools” and required universities
to disclose college performance data to help college applicants decide which college to attend).
106 Senate Hearing, supra note 103 (statement of Sen. Lamar Alexander).
107 House Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of David Lucca); see also COLLEGE BD., TRENDS IN
STUDENT AID 2018 9, 16, https://research.collegeboard.org/pdf/trends-student-aid-2018-fullreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5GN-YPWT] (noting that in the 2017-18 academic year, students
received over $200 billion in financial aid from the federal government through Pell Grants, federal
student loans, the GI Bill, tax benefits, and other mechanisms).
108 Protopsaltis & Masiuk, supra note 102, at 5.
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education oversight.109 The higher education regulatory triad is composed of
state agencies, which are responsible for protecting consumers; accreditors,
which are responsible for ensuring the quality of education; and the federal
government, which is responsible for providing the financial aid to boost
access to higher education.110 By requiring states to create new oversight
agencies, the 1992 revisions to the Higher Education Act sought to leverage
the power of the states to complement the federal government’s efforts and
the work of the educational accrediting agencies.111 Under this new model,
SPREs would be responsible for establishing stricter requirements to ensure
accountability, transparency, and adequate performance. Unfortunately, the
SPREs were never fully implemented, as Newt Gingrich’s Congress quickly
moved to trim the regulatory state after Republicans won the House in the
1994 midterm elections and implemented their Contract with America.112
Only two states were able to actually create new regulatory bodies to provide
oversight before Congress, in an effort to eradicate programs that were
“poorly focused and overly burdensome,” eliminated federal funding.113
While the political zeitgeist largely accounts for the failure of SPREs to
materialize, there were also structural concerns voiced at the time that hold
lessons for today’s reformers who seek to create more accountability, less
waste, and more effective education for American students. The SPREs were
sold to state governors and legislatures as a new partnership between state
and federal government on higher education. Despite this promise, the
federal government in reality dominated the regulatory scheme. By
essentially dictating to each state the criteria that would trigger review, the
federal government left little room for states to maneuver to account for the
great variance in the quality and kind of higher education offered in different
states across the nation.114 As a result, the program ceased to function as a
precise tool that could curtail specific kinds of problematic behavior and
instead became a blunt tool that regulated all of higher education in a
109 Terese Rainwater, The Rise and Fall of SPRE: A Look at Failed Efforts to Regulate Postsecondary
Education in the 1990s, 2 AM. ACAD. 107, 108 (2006) (noting that SPREs were created in the context of a
“weak” triad, with the goal of strengthening state oversight in partnership with federal regulators).
110 Paul Fain, Obama Administration Leans on State Agencies to Tighten Up Oversight of For-Profits,
INSIDE HIGHER ED (Mar. 4, 2016, 3:00 AM), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/03/04/
obama-administration-leans-state-agencies-tighten-oversight-profits [https://perma.cc/99QH-GZ9R].
111 Rainwater, supra note 109, at 108.
112 Id. at 111-12; see Dan Balz, This Midterm Election is Like No Other in a Generation, WASH.
POST (Nov. 4, 2018, 3:03 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/this-midterm-election-islike-no-other-in-a-generation/2018/11/04/dd92e236-df9d-11e8-85df-7a6b4d25cfbb_story.html
[https://perma.cc/K5LT-QARX] (“In 1994. . . . [a]fter 40 years of Democratic rule in the House,
Republicans led by soon-to-be-speaker Newt Gingrich swept to power on a tide of antigovernment sentiment.”).
113 H.R. REP. NO. 104-120, at 75 (1995).
114 Rainwater, supra note 109, at 111-113.
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standardized, top-down manner. Choices about how to structure agencies
have important consequences, as scholar Terry M. Moe has said, “for the
content and direction of policy.”115 To “make choices about structure, [political
actors] are implicitly making choices about policy.”116 In choosing to retain a
dominant position for itself and to exhaustively enumerate by statute the kinds
of university decisions that would trigger state review, Congress dictated the
precise policy of oversight, which made the program unpopular with states and
universities, leaving it open to political attack, which soon followed.117
Nevertheless, SPREs as a model held great promise, and with some
modifications could serve as an ideal path forward. Congress could, as it did
before, require that states create a review entity like the old SPREs in
exchange for federal financing. However, rather than impose strict, one-sizefits-all requirements on states, Congress could allow each state to provide
oversight in a manner that is customized to the needs of the state but that
meets a few baseline requirements. In other words, it may be preferable to
provide broad legislation that allows states to hire experts who can “fill in the
details” and make changes in light of their experience.118
Specifically, each state should be required to act in an enforcement
capacity and a benchmarking capacity. State agencies could promulgate
standards for the universities in their jurisdiction, and encourage
enforcement under either a private attorney general model or, if funding
allows, a public enforcement model. Each state should also be required to
provide a performance-based and outcome-based system that is transparent,
publicly accountable, and benchmarked. Such a system would help
prospective students learn how a school performs across educational metrics
and to learn how a school’s students perform in the job market after
graduation. This information, if made transparent and benchmarked, would
allow students to more accurately assess whether the value of a given
institution merits the cost of enrollment. Further, this system would allow
students and their parents to see how each university is different, and to allow
each state to see how it compares to other states in educational outcomes and
the handling of grievances. Such a system could help to curb both the abuses
115 Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in CAN THE GOVERNMENT GOVERN?
267, 268 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson, eds., 1989).
116 Id.
117 Jim Zook, Offi cials Eye Plan to Curtail State Oversight Boards, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Feb.
17, 1995), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Officials-Eye-Plan-to-Curtail/84864 [https://perma
.cc/3ZXZ-YU2D] (noting that college leaders have heavily criticized SPREs); Scott Jaschik, Congress
Moves to Eliminate Aid-Monitoring Agencies, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (May 26, 1995)
https://www.chronicle.com/article/Congress-Moves-to-Eliminate/85843 [https://perma.cc/9ZF89WY7] (reporting that college officials distressed by the federal intrusion into higher education
policy met with politicians to advocate for dismantling the system).
118 Moe, supra note 115, at 270-71.
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that currently end up being adjudicated in court under due process or contract
theories and the systemic problems with for-profit proprietary universities
that have defrauded thousands of students in recent years.119
While regulated institutions typically balk at additional regulation, a new
regulatory scheme at least would not impose additional burdens on the courts.
New state agencies could quickly accrue expertise in handling enforcement
actions and overseeing adjudication, and courts could then safely be required
to defer to the agency’s reasonable interpretation of any new regulations or
requirements that might be imposed. Such an arrangement would likely be
well received by the courts, as it would help to control their dockets as much
as the doctrine of academic deference has in the past, but with the added
benefit of giving more students a better chance of vindicating their rights.
There are of course some problems with allowing such customization at
the state level. As is often true in a federalist system, some states may not
wish to provide much meaningful oversight, leaving students in those states
with a less robust system. Further, since students often apply to colleges in
many states, it may make it difficult for students to really shop for colleges
across state lines and easily compare the performance and culture of, say, a
university in Louisiana with the performance and culture of a university in
Montana. While a state-by-state system is certainly not a panacea for all the
ills of higher education, it still would go some way toward smoothing out the
differences that currently exist in the judge-made realm of contract law.
However, such a tapestry of divergent state practices can also be a benefit,
as states may operate as laboratories of democracy to innovate and find more
cost-effective and efficient mechanisms for oversight. Additionally, as
Heather Gerken points out, “[s]tate and local governments have become sites
of empowerment for racial minorities and dissenters” who “can wield more
electoral power at the local level than they do at the national.”120 Thus,
incorporating state oversight can add a progressive bent to federalist
structures. Further, promoting an actual partnership between state and
federal government would allow the United States Department of Education
to continue its oversight capacities while also providing many more sets of
watchful eyes at the state level to complement federal oversight.
119 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, For-Profit College Company to Pay $95.5
Million to Settle Claims of Illegal Recruiting, Consumer Fraud and Other Violations (Nov. 16, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/profit-college-company-pay-955-million-settle-claims-illegalrecruiting-consumer-fraud-and [https://perma.cc/D9VC-MPYN] (disclosing that Education
Management Corporation falsely certified that it was in compliance with Title VI of the HEA in
violation of the False Claims Act, and that it unlawfully recruited students “by running a high
pressure boiler room where admissions personnel were paid based purely on the number of
students they enrolled.”).
120 Heather Gerken, A New Progressive Federalism, DEMOCRACY, Spring 2012, https://democracy
journal.org/magazine/24/a-new-progressive-federalism/ [https://perma.cc/M5PT-KLW7].
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Thus, despite the drawbacks, there is much to be gained from requiring
states to create oversight mechanisms and from allowing states to do this
important work in individually tailored ways.
CONCLUSION
Students have been suing their universities for well over a century under
different causes of action. Appropriately, in an era when higher education was
typically seen as a market transaction in which tuition was exchanged for
access to lectures and conferral of a degree, the law of contracts came to be
the primary vehicle for such lawsuits. Since that time, the nature of the
student-university relationship has changed significantly. As a degree from a
university has increasingly become a prerequisite for access to the American
labor market, and as tuition has skyrocketed, universities have become
powerful institutions in American life on which students are dependent and
against which students are relatively powerless. As a result, scholars and
observers have called for a more robust use of contract law to level the playing
field between students and universities when legal disputes arise.
Scholars are right to note that the common law has been too slow to adapt
to the rapidly changing landscape that provides the context for the studentuniversity relationship. However, even if student-university contracts began
to be treated as the contracts of adhesion that they most represent, or even if
courts began to recognize that the duty of good faith and fair dealing requires
them to create and abide by clear and fair codes of conduct, contract law
would still be ill-suited to the modern student-university relationship. The
sheer weight of precedent in contract law suggests it would take much time
and much creative litigation to turn the doctrine toward a more rigorous form
of judicial review. Thus, what is needed is administrative oversight to
promulgate a uniform set of rules to clearly lay out a university’s minimum
standards of conduct and to provide students an alternative mechanism to
redress grievances. This would also reduce the burden on the state and federal
courts in dealing with aggrieved students for whom the courts can realistically
provide no remedy except in cases of extraordinarily capricious action. And,
more importantly, it would serve to enhance the educational experience of
students and increase the public’s faith in these increasingly important and
expensive institutions.
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